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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 17511

JERRY LONG
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of distributing a Schedule
I controlled substance, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-B(l)A(a)(ii)

(1953),

as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury on
November 20, 1980 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding.

Pursuant~

his conviction, appellant was sentenced on December 12, 1980
to an indeterminate term of up to five years in the Utah State
Prison and fined $500.00.

However, appellant's prison

sentence was suspended and he was placed on a two-year
probation.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that this Court affirm the
1ud9ment and sentence of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 5, 1981, Officer Jeff Winn, an undercover
narcotics agent for the Pleasant Grove Police Department,
purchased two tablets of L.S.D. from appellant for $6.00 (T.

17).

Officer Winn had met appellant and some friends of

appellant's at approximately 8:25 that evening at the Beacon
Cafe in Lindon, Utah (T. 14-16).

Officer Winn had been

waiting for Doug Aston, who was going to sell him some
marijuana, when appellant and Gary Marchbanks came out of the
cafe and got in Officer Winn's car (T. 16).
Mr. Aston returned with the marijuana.

Soon thereafter,

During the

conversation that ensued, appellant asked if anybody wanted to
buy some "acid"

(T. 16).

Officer Winn agreed to purchase some L. S. D. from
appellant for $6.00, which he paid in the Beacon Cafe parking
lot (T. 17).

After giving appellant the money, Officer Winn

drove Dous Aston, Gary Marchbanks, and appellant, according to
appellant's instructions, to a four-plex in Orem where
appellant obtained the tablets of L.S.D. and gave them to
Officer \':inn ( T. 1 7).

The following morning the tablets were

turned over to Officer Tom Paul of the Pleasant Grove Police
-2-
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Department, who sent them to the State Health Lab for tests
(T.

24).

The tests confirmed that the tablets were L.S.D. (T,

29).
On or about the 16th of June, 1980, Officer Winn,
after being released as an undercover agent, assisted in the
arrest of appellant at appellant's home in Pleasant Grove (T.
21).
Prior to appellant's trial he made a motion to
supress the evidence obtained by Officer Winn in Orem.
motion was denied by Judge Ballif (R. 12, 13).

This

At trial

appellant presented an alibi defense to show that he had not
been at the Beacon Cafe on March 5, 1980, but that he had been
celebrating a birthday with his brother.

Appellant called u

witnesses his sister, Cindy (T. 58), and his brother, Ben
42), to corroborate his story.

(T,

Also testifying in behalf cl

appellant was Gary Marchbanks, who stated that he did not go
with appellant and Officer Winn on the night of the 5th (T.
89).

After presenting Mr. Marchbanks' testimony, counsel fm

appellant indicated he had a few more witnesses (T. 95);
however, after a moment defense counsel rested, indicating
that the other witnesses were not present (T. 95).

No requut

was made at this time for a continuance, nor did the defense
counsel explain to the court the nature of the testimony these
witnesses would have given.
-3-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
C0'1PULSORY PROCESS.
Before examining the merits of appellant's claim
t~at

he was denied his right to compulsory process, respondent

sub~its

that there are a number of procedural issues that

should be considered.

First, this Court has consistently held

that it will not hear issues raised for the first time on
appeal.

State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975).

In

Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470
P. 2d 399

(1970), this Court said:
Orderly procedure, whose proper
purpose is the final settlement of
controversies, requires that a party must
present his entire case and his theory or
theories of recovery to the trial court;
and having done so, he cannot thereafter
change to some different theory and thus
attempt to keep in motion a merry-goround of litigation.
Id. at 401.
An examination of the record in the instant case

discloses that appellant failed to raise this issue at trial.
The record reveals that appellant's counsel, near the end of
the defense, anticipated having a few more witnesses (T. 95);
however, upon discovering that the witnesses were not present,
appellant's counsel rested (T.

95).

There is no indication

that appellant requested a continuation to secure the
-4-
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presence of his witnesses at trial, or that the court refused
to allow the testimony of appellant's witnesses on the grounds
that, the testimony was cumulative.

No offer was made

concerning anticipated testimony of the witnesses;

therefore

respondent submits that appellant's failure to request a
continuance or to make an objection precludes him from
claiming that he has been denied compulsory process on appeal.
The second procedural issue, which becomes apparent
upon reading appellant's brief, is that appellant cites a
number of facts not contained within the record.

There is no

indication in the record that six subpoenas were delivered to
the Utah County Constable, or that the Constable delivered
some of the subpoenas 12 hours late.

In addition, appellant's

reference to the trial court's ruling that the testimony of
the additional witnesses was merely cumulative is nowhere to
be found in the record

(appellant's brief, page 4).

Finally,

even though the record indicates there was a previous trial
and that some of the witnesses who testified at the first
trial did not testify at the second (R. 4), there is no way of
telling what their testimony was or the effect it may have haci
on the jury.
It is fundamental that an appeal is limited to t~
proceedings in the lower court upon which the Judgment is
based.

U.R.C.P., Rule 75.

In Tucker Realty Inc. v.
-5-
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16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), this Court stated

in response to an attempt to supplement the record with
evidence which was not part of the lower court proceedings:
It requires but a moment's reflection to
realize what a chaotic situation would
exist if after a judgment is entered and
an appeal taken, the parties could keep
on having supplemental proceedings,
adducing new evidence, and forwarding the
transcripts to the Supreme Court.
The
illogic and irregularity of attempting to
do so is so obvious that further comment
as to its impropriety is unnecessary.
Id. at 413, 414.
Respondent submits that the facts cited by appellant in Point
I of his brief are not properly before this Court.

Respondent

further submis that it has no access to these facts and
therefore cannot verify their accuracy.

For these reasons

this Court should not reach the merits of appellant's claim
that his right to compulsory process has been denied unless
appellant properly presents a complete record to this Court.
If there are omissions in the record or if
a?pellant has newly discovered evidence, there are alternative
remedies he can pursue.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 75(h) errors or omissions in the record can be
corrected.

Rule 75(h) provides in part:
If anything material to
omitted from the record
error or accident or is
therein, the parties by

either party is
on appeal by
misstated
stipulation, or

-6-
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the district court, either before or
after the record is transmitted to the
Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, on a
proper suggestion or of its own
initiative, may direct that the omission
or misstatement shall be corrected, and
if necessary that a supplemental record
shall be certified and transmitted by the
clerk of the district court.
All other
questions as to the content and form of
the record shall be presented to the
Supreme Court.
Respondent submits that if there has been an omission in the
record, appellant should comply with the provisions of Rule
75(h).
A second remedy available to appellant, i f he has
discovered new evidence, is found in Utah Code Annotated,
§75-35-24,

(1953), as amended.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides that a new trial may be granted
"in the interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of a party."

If appellant discovered after his trial

that some of his witnesses were not present at trial because
the Utah County Constable failed to timely deliver the
subpoenas and that this, in fact, prejudiced him, then
appellant should make a motion for a new trial.

Further

remedies available to appellant include petitioning for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus or a Writ of Coram Nobis under Rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
-7-
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Before addressing the merits of appellant's claim,
respondent again points out the difficulty in making an
argument wnen there is no way to verify the accuracy of
appellant's allegations; however, even assuming the facts
stated by appellant are true, respondent submits the trial
court acted properly.

Appellant states that persons unrelated

to appellant did not testify at his second trial because of a
constable's failure to timely serve them with a subpoena.
Appellant also infers that he made a request at trial that
would have enabled him to admit the testimony of these
witnesses, but that this request was refused on the grounds
that the testimony was cumulative (appellant's brief, page 4).
Respondent agrees that appellant has the right to compulsory
process; however, appellant's right to present competent
evidence at trial is subject to the trial judge's discretion
to exclude admissible evidence if the judge finds that the
pro8ative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
che risk that its admission will cause any of the following
problems:
(a) necessitate undue consumption of
time, or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c}
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party
who has not had reasonable opportunity to
anticipate that such evidence would be
offered.
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

-8-
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In this case numerous witnesses at trial testified that
appellant was not with Officer Winn on March 5, 1980, the
night, Officer Winn purchased the L. S. D. from appellant.

They

claim that appellant on that night was at another bar
celebrating his birthday with his brother, Ben (See the
testimony of Elmer Benson Long, T. 42; Cindy Marie Stowe, T.
58; Jerry Long, T. 66; and Gary Marchbanks, T. 85).

Appellant

indicates in his brief that the other witnesses would have
also testified that appellant was at a different location on
March 5, 1980 than the location alleged by the state
{appellant's brief, page 4).

I t is

true that this additional

testimony may have added a dimension to appellant's alibi
defense; nevertheless, in view of the fact that numerous
witnesses had testified that appellant was not with Officer
Winn on March 5, 1980, the probative value of additional
testimony was outweighed by the risk that a great deal of ti•
would be consumed in granting a continuance to secure the
presence of the additional witnesses at trial.
Appellant argues that proof that he was prejudiced
by the absence of these additional witnesses is established by
the fact that he was not convicted with their testimony at his
first trial, but was convicted without their testimony at his
second trial.

The fallacy of this argument is obvious.

impossible to conclude from these facts that appellant's
-9-
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It

is

conviction in his second trial was caused by the absence of
the additional witnesses.

Many other factors could have

intervened and resulted in his conviction.

First, at

appellant's second trial he was tried by a new set of jurors.
second, at the second trial there might have been numerous
dif:erences in the appearance and demeanor of those who
testified which may have affected their credibility.

Third,

the strategies and arguments made by counsel for both sides
might have been different in the second trial.

Therefore,

respondent submits that appellant's conviction at his second
trial does not establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the additional testimony.
Respondent submits that even i f the exclusion of
this additional testimony was error, this still would not be a
oasis to reverse appellant's conviction.

Rule 5 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of
the erroneous exclusion of evidence
unless (a) it appears of record that the
proponent of the evidence either made
known the substance of the evidence in a
form and by a method approved by the
judge, or indicated the substance of the
expected evidence by questions indicating
the desired answers, and (b) the court
which passes upon the effect of the error
or errors is of the opinion that the
excluded evidence would probably have had
a substantial influence in bringing about
a different verdict or finding.

-10-
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In this case appellant provided substantial testimony to
corroborate his alibi defense; however,
beli~ve

the jury chose to

the police officer over the witnesses who testified

appellant's behalf.

There is no reason to believe that the

additional testimony would have changed this result.
Therefore, respondent submits that appellant was not
prejudiced.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY OFFICER WINN IN
OREM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
Appellant argues that Officer Winn exercised his
authority outside the territorial limits of his jurisdictioo
and therefore the evidence he obtained by such action should
not have been admitted at trial.

Appellant unsuccessfully

moved to suppress this evidence on this ground.

Respondent

argues that on March 5, 1981 Officer Winn was working as an
undercover narcotics agent for the Pleasant Grove Police
Department, and that he consummated a drug sale in Orem which
had begun within Officer Winn's jurisdiction.

However,

respondent submits that the authorities cited by appellant are
not applicable to the facts of the instant case, that OfficH
Winn acted properly under the circumstances, and that the
evidence obtained by Officer Winn in Orem was properly
admitted at trial.
-11-
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-13-36

(1953), as

ar:-,ended, which was in effect on March 5, 1981, gave police
officers the authority to act outside their normal jurisdictions in certain circumstances.

This statute was enacted

to promote cooperation between the various law enforcement
agencies of this state and to protect local law enforcement
agencies from liability arising from the actions of intruding
police officers within the local jurisdiction.

This purpose

is manifest in the last line of subsection 2, which provides:
Unless specifically requested to aid a
police officer of another jurisdiction or
otherwise as provided for by law, no legal
responsibility for a police officer's actions
outside his normal jurisdiction and as provided
herein, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority.
Nothing in this statute refers to the admissibility of
e,.-idence obtained by police officers outside their own
jurisdiction.

Therefore, since this statute was designed

to promote effective law enforcement and not to confer
rights upon defendants in criminal proceedings, respondent
submits that the trial court properly denied appellant's
motion to suppress the evidence (R. 12, 13).
Furthermore, Officer Winn's participation in the
druc "buy" did not require or involve the exercise of his
-12-
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authority as a peace officer.

This could have been

accomplished by a private citizen or an informant who had no
peace officer powers.

Since Officer Winn did not make an

arrest in Orem, he was not exercising his authority as a peac,
officer in that jurisdiction and thus the

st~tute

does not

apply at all.
Even if this Court finds that the statute applies
to this case, the conduct of Officer Winn in exercising peace
officer authority beyond his own jurisdiction was justified
under §77-13-36(b) since the offense was ongoing in each
jurisdiction and was in fact "committed" in Officer Winn's
presence in Orem.
Appellant also asserts that Officer Winn's conduct
outside his jurisdiction was controlled by Utah Code
Annotated,

<;,77-7-3 ( 1953), as amended.

Section 77-7-3, which

is essentially the same as Utah Code Annotated, §77-13-4
(1953), as amended,

(which was in effect when these events

occurred) provides:
A private person may arrest another;
(1) For a public offense committed or
attempted in his presence.
(2) When the person arrested has
committed a felony although not in his
presence.
(3) When a felony has been in fact
committed and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person arrested to have
committed it.
-13-
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The following reasons establish that this statute
has no application to the instant case.

First, this statute

applies to arrests made by private persons.

In the instant

case appellant was arrested in Pleasant Grove three months
after the drug sale (T.

21).

Therefore, since the arrest took

place in Officer Winn's jurisdiction, he was not acting as a
private person when he made the arrest, but was acting in his
official capacity as a police officer.
Second, this statute provides that private persons
can only make arrests under certain conditions; however, it
does not require that those conditions exist before a private
person can take any action.

For example, a private person can

take down a license plate number, get a description, or notify
the police without first knowing that a felony has been
CO!l\!1'.i tted.

To hold that a private person could only assist

the police when the conditions set forth in the statute are
present would substantially hinder law enforcement.

Third,

the purpose of this statute is to protect private citizens
froD civil liability arising from false arrest, and to
proscribe the dangers of uncontrolled vigilantism.

Its

purpose is not to frustrate legitimate law enforcement
activities.

Com v. Harris, 415 N.E. 2d 216 (Mass. 1981).
Some of these considerations distinguish People v.

Aldapa, 17 Cal. App.

3d 184, 94 Cal. Rptr.

579 (1979) from

-14-
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the instant case.

In Aldapa, the court held that the

defendant had been illegally arrested and therefore the
evide.nce obtained pursuant to the arrest was inadmissible at
trial.

The court found that the officers who made the arrest

outside their jurisdiction were acting as private persons.
Therefore,

the validity of the arrest was determined under

§837 of the California Penal Code, which provided for arrest
by private persons.

Section 837 stated that a private

pers~

may make an arrest "when a felony has been in fact committed,
and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested
to have committed it."

In Aldapa the defendant was charged

with possession and possession of a narcotic for sale.

The

court noted that the police officers had arrested the
defendant prior to discovering a bag of heroin he had in his
possession.

Therefore, the arrest was not valid under §837

because the police officers were not aware that a crime had
been committed until after the arrest had been made.
In Aldapa the evidence was inadmissible because it
had been obtained as the result of an illegal arrest.

In the

instant case appellant does not challenge the validity of his
arrest.

Therefore, he cannot claim that the evidence obtained

by Officer Winn in Orem was inadmissible because it was
obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest.
inference,

The logical

then, from appellant's argument is that Aldapa
-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stands for the proposition that any evidence obtained by a
private person before he/she knows the defendant has committed
A cri~e

is inadmissible.

Respondent submits that Aldapa is

not subject to such a broad interpretation.
hppellant further asserts that Officer Winn's
conduct was unauthorized and therefore illegal.
subrni~s

Respondent

that Officer Winn's conduct was authorized.

Utah Code

Annotated, §77-36-4 provides that a police officer can
exercise his authority outside his normal jurisdiction in
response to public offenses committed in his presence.

The

public offense committed by appellant in this case was the
distribution of a controlled substance for value.

Appellant

offered to sell L.S.D. to Officer Winn, took six dollars from
Winn
('C.

~or

the drug,

16, 17).

and gave Officer Winn two tablets of L.S.D.

Appellant obviously committed the offense in

Officer Winn's presence and therefore Officer Winn's conduct
was aJthorized.

Furthermore, even assuming that Officer

Winn's actions were unauthorized, that does not mean his acts
were illegal.
Officer Winn's conduct in the instant case was not
like

~~at

taken by the police in Aldapa, who conducted

numerous surveillances of the defendant's house for a threernonth period and eventually arrested the defendant without
ever notifying the local authorities.

Here Officer Winn did

-16-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not have time to notify Orem officials once the buy began.
The only alternative to the course of action he took was to
ref4se to go to Orem to get the L.S.D.

This not only would

have caused the sale to fall through, but it might have bloi:·
Officer Winn's cover as well.

Certainly the. legitimate

concerns of law enforcement justify Officer Winn's actions
this case.

See Com. v. Harris, 415 N.E. 2d 216 (1981).

i:

If

appellant's view as to the operation of the statute were
adopted, no police officer in a case such as this, where

t~

commission of a crime begins in one jurisdiction and culmiatE
in another, could follow the defendant into the other
jurisdiction to allow the crime to be completed.

Defendants

in such a situation could undertake drug sales with

impuni~

merely by making the exchange in a different jurisdiction
the one in which the original contact is made.

~r

Such a burde:.

on law enforcement is clearly not contemplated by the statutE
In consideration of these facts respondent submits that
officer Winn acted properly and that the evidence he obtaine:
was properly adm.itted at trial.
CONCLUSION
Appellant claims that he was denied his right to
compulsory process at trial; however, appellant did not raisE
this issue in the lower court, and therefore he cannot raise

-17-
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it

the first time on appeal.

f:x

As part of his argument,

appellant refers to many facts which cannot be found in the
of£1c1al record.

Respondent submits that before this Court

considers the merits of appellant's claim, appellant should
follow established procedures to correct or supplement the
record if it contains mistakes or omissions.
~ourt

Even if this

should decide to reach the merits of this issue,

respondent submits that the trial court properly excluded the
testimony of appellant's additional witnesses under Rule 45 of
the Ctah Rules of Evidence and that the admission of the
evidence would not have had a substantial influence on the
verdict.
hppellant's second claim is that evidence obtained
by Officer Winn outside

the limits of his jurisdiction should

':ave been suppressed at trial; however, §77-13-4 was not
designed to frustrate law enforcement, but to promote it
t~rough

orderly cooperation between the various law

e~forcement

authorities.

Respondent submits that Officer Winn

complied with (77-13-4, that he acted reasonably, and did not
~io:ate

any of defendant's rights.

-18-
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Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the
evidence.
DATED this 6th day of October, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON

"l

EJ;J-"1/,~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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